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MOTION OF CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW 
PROFESSORS FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AS 
AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER 
The Civil Procedure law professors identified 
in Appendix A respectfully move for leave to file a 
brief as amici curiae in support of the Petitioner.  
Counsel of record for the parties received timely no-
tice of amici curiae’s intent to file this brief as re-
quired by this Court’s Rule 37.2(a). Counsel for Peti-
tioner consented in writing to the filing of the brief, 
and their written consent has been lodged with the 
Clerk’s office.  Counsel for Respondents stated that 
they did not consent to the filing of this brief, neces-
sitating the filing of this motion. 
Amici curiae have a deep and abiding interest 
as scholars and teachers in the interpretation and 
application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and in particular the rules of pleading.  Many amici 
have participated before this Court in amicus briefs 
regarding pleading and other issues relating to the 
application and interpretation of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.  Arriving at a consistent and un-
derstandable pleading doctrine is therefore of great 
interest to amici.  Our continuing interest in the 
clarity and simplicity of the rules of pleading has 
been intensified by the growing confusion created by 
the perceived changes in the requirements for stat-
ing a valid claim.  
This confusion is highlighted by the present 
case, and thus the case affords an excellent oppor-
tunity to provide guidance to the lower courts.  The 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the 




cause it did not provide enough specific facts to meet 
the pleading standard enunciated by this Court in 
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  Amici seek 
leave to file this brief in support of the Petition be-
cause the Ninth Circuit’s decision is at odds with 
this Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, and be-
cause lower courts continue to be mired in conflict 
and confusion over how to apply the decisions in 
those cases.  This case therefore provides this Court 
with an opportunity to clarify the meaning of those 
decisions and thereby reduce the uncertainty that 
lingers over pleading doctrine. 
Amici curiae therefore respectfully request 
that they be granted leave to file the accompanying 
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
Amici curiae are scholars with expertise in 
civil procedure who have an interest in the proper 
interpretation of federal pleading standards follow-
ing Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), 
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  Amici file 
this brief because the decision by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit in this case cannot be 
squared with proper pleading doctrine and goes far 
beyond any reasonable interpretation of this Court’s 
holdings in Twombly and Iqbal.  Certiorari is war-
ranted to correct the Ninth Circuit’s application of 
these cases and to clarify the rampant confusion that 
has emerged in the lower courts in the wake of 
Twombly and Iqbal. 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION 
Amici curiae submit this brief in support of 
the petition for a writ of certiorari because the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision is a radical application of pleading 
doctrine, reflecting broad confusion that has arisen 
in the lower courts concerning the proper application 
                                                 
1 As explained in the accompanying motion, counsel of rec-
ord for the parties received timely notice of amici curiae’s in-
tent to file this brief as required by this Court’s Rule 37.2(a), 
but counsel for Respondents did not provide written consent to 
the filing of the brief.  Petitioner had provided written consent 
to the filing of this brief, a copy of which has been lodged with 
the Clerk of Court.  Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, 
amici state that no counsel for a party authored any part of this 
brief, and no such counsel or party made a monetary contribu-
tion intended to fund the preparation or submission of this 
brief.  No person other than amici curiae, its members, its 
counsel, or Outten & Golden LLP made a monetary contribu-
tion to the brief’s preparation or submission. 
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of this Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal.  The 
instant case involves Petitioner’s allegations that 
Respondents failed to pay overtime wages required 
by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).  See Pet. 3-
4.  Among other allegations, Petitioner alleged that 
he regularly worked more than 40 hours per week, 
but was not paid overtime on these occasions, and 
that Respondents attempted to obscure this fact by 
falsifying employment records.  App. 51a-53a.  The 
Ninth Circuit held that Petitioner’s complaint must 
be dismissed with prejudice2 because the complaint 
did not allege that he had “worked more than forty 
hours in a given workweek without being compen-
sated for the overtime hours worked during that 
workweek,” App. 16a (emphasis added), and did not 
“estimate the length of [his] average workweek dur-
ing the applicable period and the average rate at 
which [he] was paid, the amount of overtime wages 
[he] believes [he] is owed, or any other facts that will 
permit the court to find plausibility,” App. 17a.  Con-
trary to this Court’s admonition in Iqbal and 
Twombly, the Ninth Circuit applied a heightened 
fact pleading standard to FLSA claims, and required 
more from a FLSA plaintiff at the pleading stage 
than might be required at trial, given the FLSA’s re-
quirement that employers maintain accurate payroll 
records. 
Review of the Ninth Circuit’s decision is im-
portant for several reasons.3  First, lower courts 
                                                 
2 Because the district court did not specify the nature of the 
dismissal, it operates as a dismissal with prejudice.  See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 41(b). 
3 The petition and the decision below identify quite clearly 
the conflict among the circuits that has arisen with respect to 
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have openly expressed confusion regarding the ap-
plication of Twombly and Iqbal, particularly with re-
spect to policing the line between “factual” and “con-
clusory” allegations.  This case presents an ideal op-
portunity to provide needed guidance to the lower 
courts.  Second, the Ninth Circuit’s decision was er-
roneous, because it ignored the FLSA context in 
which the instant case arose, and because it insisted 
on an overly formalistic pleading requirement that 
betrays this Court’s admonition in Iqbal and 
Twombly that the Federal Rules do not require the 
pleading of “specific” facts.  See Twombly, 550 U.S. 
at 570 (“[W]e do not require heightened fact pleading 
of specifics, . . . .”); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686-87 
(distinguishing between pleading under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 8 and the “particularity” required when pleading 
matters encompassed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)).  The 
Ninth Circuit’s decision makes pleading a technical 
game and will take courts further from the merits 
adjudication that was one of the principal goals of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  See, e.g., Fo-
man v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962).  In sum, 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision applies a heightened 
pleading standard that finds no home in Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 8 or 12, or in this Court’s 
decisions in Twombly and Iqbal. 
 
                                                                                                    
the proper pleading of FLSA claims. See Pet. 15-20; App. 13a-
16a.  Amici therefore will not address that particular division 
in the lower courts. 
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I. The Petition Should Be Granted Because 
Lower Courts Are in Conflict Regarding 
the Application of Pleading Standards 
Following Twombly and Iqbal. 
Iqbal and Twombly introduced a change in 
federal pleading standards that had remained for-
mally static for five decades, since this Court’s deci-
sion in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).  Under 
Conley’s regime, complaints satisfied Rule 8(a)(2) so 
long as they provided fair notice to the defendant of 
the nature of suit, 355 U.S. at 47–48, and Rule 
12(b)(6) was to be invoked in those rare cases in 
which no viable legal theory supported a plaintiff’s 
claim.  Twombly, a complex antitrust case, intro-
duced significant change.  While Twombly did not 
cast doubt on Conley’s fair notice standard – in fact, 
it quoted that part of Conley with approval. 550 U.S. 
at 555, and also endorsed Swierkiewicz v. Sorema 
N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), a decision that applied no-
tice pleading to an employment discrimination com-
plaint – the decision articulated a “plausibility” in-
quiry, 550 U.S. at 556–57, a term that was new to 
Rule 12 adjudications.  Two years later, Iqbal made 
clear that Twombly’s approach applied in all civil 
cases, not just to antitrust claims or cases in which 
the costs of discovery were likely to be high and set-
tlement-coercing.  556 U.S at 684. 
Iqbal also articulated a two-step process for 
evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint. First, 
courts must review each allegation in a complaint 
and exclude from consideration those allegations 
that are stated in a “conclusory” fashion.  Id. at 680-
81.  Second, courts must conduct a plausibility anal-
ysis that assesses the fit between the non-conclusory 
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facts alleged in the complaint and the relief claimed.  
Id. at 681.  The judge may assess plausibility by call-
ing on his or her “judicial experience and common 
sense,” in some cases relying on assessments of the 
existence of alternative lawful explanations for the 
conduct alleged in the complaint.  Id. at 679, 681-82. 
 Lower courts have experienced difficulty in 
applying this federal pleading standard, in part be-
cause some courts perceive tension between Iqbal 
and Twombly on the one hand, and prior decisions—
including ones that this Court has continued to cite 
with approval—on the other.  See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. 
Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 768 F.3d 247, 
254 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Since Twombly and Iqbal, 
Swierkiewicz's continued vitality has been an open 
question in this Circuit.”); Horras v. American Capi-
tal Strategies, Ltd., 729 F.3d 798, 807 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(“Iqbal says that Twombly applies to all civil actions, 
but Swierkiewicz . . . , reaffirmed by Twombly, pro-
vides that the simplified notice pleading standard of 
Rule 8(a) likewise applies to all civil actions.”); 
Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 
1028 (7th Cir. 2013) (referring to “unresolved ten-
sion” in pleading cases); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 
1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 
2101 (2012) (“To the extent that we perceive a differ-
ence in the application of Rule 8(a) in the two groups 
of cases, it is difficult to know in cases that come be-
fore us whether we should apply the more lenient or 
the more demanding standard.”); In re Insurance 
Brokerage Antitrust Litigation, 618 F.3d 300, 319 
n.17 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting disagreement within 
Third Circuit regarding how to interpret 
Swierkiewicz in light of Iqbal); Swanson v. Citibank, 
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N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (courts are 
“still struggling” with how to apply federal pleading 
standards after Twombly and Iqbal); Ruston v. Town 
Bd. for Town of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 
2010) (noting that Iqbal had created tension with 
prior Circuit cases involving pleading of equal pro-
tection claims).  On its own, this confusion is suffi-
cient ground to grant certiorari in this case, but as 
both the Petition and the decision below explain, 
there also is a deep and acknowledged split among 
the courts of appeals with respect to how to apply 
federal pleading standards in FLSA cases.  See Pet. 
15-20; App. 13a-16a. 
Although this Court has addressed pleading 
after Iqbal, it has not done so in a case that squarely 
addresses the confusion lingering in the lower 
courts.  For instance, in Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 
521, 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011), the Court cited to 
Swierkiewicz rather than Iqbal or Twombly when it 
described the federal pleading standard.  Id. at __, 
131 S. Ct. at 1296 (“Because this case was resolved 
on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 
the question below was ‘not whether [Skinner] will 
ultimately prevail’ on his procedural due process 
claim, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 
(1974), but whether his complaint was sufficient to 
cross the federal court's threshold.”).  But Skinner 
did not principally concern application of the federal 
pleading standard; rather it raised the question 
whether a convicted prisoner seeking access to bio-
logical evidence for DNA testing could assert that 
claim via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or was required to file a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus.  It therefore did 
not provide a full opportunity for the Court to clarify 
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pleading standards.  And this Term, the Court in 
Johnson v. City of Shelby, 135 S. Ct. 346 (2014), reaf-
firmed Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics In-
telligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 
(1993), a Conley-era pleading case that confirmed 
that there is no heightened pleading requirement for 
civil rights claims against municipalities. Johnson, 
135 S. Ct. at 347 (citing Leatherman).  But the criti-
cal issue in Johnson concerned whether a plaintiff 
had to specifically identify the statute under which a 
claim is brought in order to state a plausible claim.  
Id.  Johnson did not address in detail the factual suf-
ficiency of the complaint at issue, other than to say 
that it “stated simply, concisely, and directly events 
that [plaintiffs] alleged entitled them to damages 
from the city,” thereby accomplishing the purpose of 
“inform[ing] the city of the factual basis for their 
complaint.” Id.  In contrast to Johnson and Skinner, 
this case presents an ideal vehicle to resolve the con-
fusion that has arisen in the lower courts as to when 
a complaint’s allegations are factually sufficient.  
The outcome in the Ninth Circuit rose and fell on the 
question of the sufficiency of Petitioner’s factual al-
legations, not on the legal sufficiency of the plead-
ings that was central to both Skinner and Johnson. 
 Because of the confusion that persists in the 
lower courts, amici curiae respectfully urge the 
Court to grant the petition for writ of certiorari to 
clarify the applicable pleading standard with respect 
to factual sufficiency.  Substantial risks stem from 
ignoring these concerns and allowing lower courts to 
continue to misinterpret Twombly and Iqbal.  One 
appeals court judge recently engaged in the “thought 
experiment” of subjecting the allegations of injury 
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made by the plaintiffs in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), to an “aggressive[]” plausi-
bility analysis.  McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 
F.3d 611, 626-27 (7th Cir. 2011) (Hamilton, J., dis-
senting in part).  He began with the following critical 
allegation from the plaintiffs’ complaint in Brown:  
The educational opportunities provided 
by defendants for infant plaintiffs in the 
separate all-Negro schools are inferior 
to those provided for white school chil-
dren similarly situated in violation of 
the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States. The respects in 
which these opportunities are inferior 
include the physical facilities, curricula, 
teaching, resources, student personnel 
services, access and all other educa-
tional factors, tangible and intangible, 
offered to school children in Topeka. 
Apart from all other factors, the racial 
segregation herein practiced in and of 
itself constitutes an inferiority in edu-
cational opportunity offered to Negroes, 
when compared to educational oppor-
tunity offered to whites.  
Amendment to Paragraph Eight of the 
Amended Complaint, Brown v. Board of 
Education, 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 
1951), available at 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php




As Judge Hamilton suggested, a strong argu-
ment could be made that the first and third sentenc-
es are bare legal conclusions that should be disre-
garded under Iqbal. 671 F.3d at 627.  This leaves the 
middle sentence, which contains some facts but—
under a misguided reading of Iqbal such as the 
Ninth Circuit’s in the decision below—might be in-
sufficient because there is no detail as to “how the 
listed items are inferior.”  Id.  It should go without 
saying that if there is uncertainty about whether a 
case like Brown will be dismissed at the Rule 
12(b)(6) stage before discovery and a merits deter-
mination, this Court should intervene to articulate 
clearly the federal pleading standard.  This case pre-
sents the Court with that opportunity. 
II. The Petition Should Be Granted Because 
the Ninth Circuit’s Decision Is Not Faith-
ful to this Court’s Decision in Iqbal and 
Twombly. 
The petition for certiorari should also be 
granted because the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is in 
conflict with both the letter and spirit of Iqbal and 
Twombly.  First, and most critically, in both deci-
sions this Court disclaimed any intent to adopt a 
pleading standard requiring the allegation of specific 
facts.  In Twombly, for instance, responding to the 
concern that its approach is in conflict with 
Swierkiewicz, this Court stated that “we do not re-
quire heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only 
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausi-
ble on its face.”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.  And in 
Iqbal, the Court was concerned about a plaintiff 
pleading “the bare elements of his cause of action” 
and nothing more.  556 U.S. at 687.  Second, this 
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Court emphasized in Iqbal that the plausibility in-
quiry is context-specific, and must take into account 
the underlying substantive law.  Id. at 679.  Finally, 
courts must bear in mind that a complaint is not 
meant to prove a claim; it simply must allege facts 
that—when accepted as true—“raise a reasonable 
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” sat-
isfying the elements of the legal claim. Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 556; see also Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Sira-
cusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1323 (2011) (quoting 
Twombly).  
With this guidance in mind, the errors of the 
Ninth Circuit’s opinion are clear.  First, the court be-
low faulted Petitioner’s complaint for failing to iden-
tify the “given” week in which overtime violations 
occurred, App. 16a,4 and did not “estimate the length 
of [his] average workweek during the applicable pe-
riod and the average rate at which [he] was paid, the 
amount of overtime wages [he] believes [he] is owed, 
                                                 
4 The panel opinion originally found the complaint insuffi-
cient because it did not identify the “specific” week in which 
overtime violations occurred.  App. 38a, 40a.  The panel then 
sua sponte issued a new opinion, replacing the word “specific” 
with “given.”  App. 3a-4a.  That the Ninth Circuit considered 
this change significant is indicative of the panel’s hyper-
technical application of Iqbal and Twombly.  The dictionary 
definition of “given,” when used as an adjective as it is in the 
Ninth Circuit’s opinion, is “specified.”  See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 539 (11th ed. 2003).   Although one 
hesitates to ascribe a motive to an unexplained sua sponte 
modification of the decision below, one conceivable explanation 
is that the panel was conscious that this Court had disclaimed 
any intent in requiring the pleading of “specific” facts.  See 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.  But engaging in wordplay by re-
placing “specific” with “given” does not resolve the tension be-
tween the decision below and this Court’s precedent. 
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or any other facts that will permit the court to find 
plausibility,” App. 17a.  The lower court did not ex-
plain how the addition of these facts would enable it 
to better evaluate the plausibility of the plaintiff’s 
complaint.  Certainly, Form 11’s negligence com-
plaint, held up as an example of sufficient pleading 
in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10, provides no detail 
as to how the defendant was driving, how damages 
were calculated, or any number of other facts that 
might be relevant to a liability and damages assess-
ment.  See Form 11, Complaint for Negligence, 
Forms App., Fed. R. Civ. P.  Nor did the complaint 
found sufficient by this Court in Johnson.  See Com-
plaint, Johnson v. City of Shelby, No. 10 Civ. 36 
(N.D. Miss. March 10, 2010).  The Ninth Circuit’s 
approach to plausibility insisted on evidence of lia-
bility and appears to be premised on the assumption 
that a plaintiff must allege all facts that he might 
reasonably have access to, when that is not the role 
of the pleading.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (a com-
plaint must allege facts that “raise a reasonable ex-
pectation that discovery will reveal evidence” satisfy-
ing the elements of the legal claim); Swierkiewicz, 
534 U.S. at 511 (“[I]t is not appropriate to require a 
plaintiff to plead facts establishing a prima facie 
case.”) 
Moreover, in the context of an FLSA case, re-
quiring plaintiffs to identify the specific week in 
which they were not paid overtime, the amount they 
are owed, or similar details, runs afoul of the reme-
dial purpose of the statute and is precisely the kind 
of gamesmanship that the Rules were meant to do 
away with.  If this case were to proceed to trial, and 
were Petitioner to demonstrate the inaccuracy of the 
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Respondents’ records, Petitioner would satisfy his 
burden of proof by introducing enough evidence to 
support a reasonable inference of hours worked.  See 
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 
687 (1946) (when an employer fails to keep accurate 
time records reflecting hours of work, a plaintiff may 
“show the amount and extent of that work as a mat-
ter of just and reasonable inference”).  As many 
courts have held, this burden can be satisfied by an 
FLSA plaintiff’s estimate of hours worked, whether 
adduced through testimony or other record evidence.  
See Monterossa v. Martinez Rest. Corp., No. 11 CIV. 
3689 JMF, 2012 WL 3890212, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
7, 2012); Rodriguez v. Almighty Cleaning, Inc., 784 
F. Supp. 2d 114, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); Ventura v. Be-
bo Foods, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 8, 13 (D.D.C. 2010).  
The burden would then shift to the Respondents to 
come forward with evidence to negate “the inference 
to be drawn from the employee’s evidence.” Ander-
son, 328 U.S. at 687–88.  The reason for this burden-
shifting scheme is that, although an FLSA plaintiff 
bears the burden of proving “that he performed work 
for which he was not properly compensated,” the 
“remedial nature of [the FLSA] and the great public 
policy which it embodies . . .  militate against mak-
ing that burden an impossible hurdle for the em-
ployee.”  Id. at 687.   
The Ninth Circuit’s rule would impose an ex-
tremely difficult hurdle for FLSA plaintiffs to over-
come at the pleading stage, when a plaintiff’s burden 
should be lower than the one he would bear at the 
proof stage.  FLSA claims may be instituted up to 
three years after an alleged violation, 29 U.S.C. § 
255(a).  The Ninth Circuit’s decision puts the onus 
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on a plaintiff, several years removed from the        
violation in question, to identify the specific week in 
which overtime was not paid.  Moreover, such a rule 
serves to undermine Rule 8(a)’s purpose, which as 
this Court held this Term requires only that       
plaintiffs “state[] simply, concisely, and directly 
events that [plaintiffs] allege[] entitle[] them to 
damages.”  Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 347.  The            
information required by the Ninth Circuit does not 
provide any additional relevant notice to the          
defendant of the factual basis for the plaintiff’s 
claim.  Moreover, defendants have at least as much 
access, if not more, to precisely this evidence.  And 
as discussed above, if the defendants do not have  
adequate employment records, the FLSA establishes 
a presumption in favor of the correctness of the 
plaintiff’s evidence as to underpayment.  See        
Anderson, 328 U.S. at 687.  In short, the Ninth    
Circuit’s holding provides a technical ground for    
securing a dismissal and shielding a defendant from 
liability that might easily be imposed were the case 




 For the foregoing reasons, amici urge the 
Court to grant the petition for certiorari and vacate 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision. 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
ALEXANDER A. REINERT 
  Counsel of Record 
55 FIFTH AVENUE 
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